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Significance statements 1 
1. We demonstrate that the larger cost for switching attention towards internal representations 2 
compared to external stimuli cannot be explained in terms of a priming or memory retrieval 3 
account. 4 
2. The data seems to be best accounted for by an associative interference account. This account entails 5 
that internal attention can be better shielded from external intrusions than the other way around, 6 
which raises some intriguing further research questions.7 
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Abstract 1 
At present, the process of switching attention between external stimuli and internal representations is not 2 
well understood. To address this, Verschooren and colleagues (2019) recently designed a novel paradigm 3 
where participants were cued to switch attention between external and internal information on a trial-by-4 
trial basis. The authors observed an asymmetrical switch cost, which was larger when switching towards 5 
internal than external material, even though participants performed internal trials faster. In the current 6 
study, we sought to establish the cause of this asymmetry by adjudicating between predictions from three 7 
theoretical accounts: associative interference, priming, and memory retrieval. After replicating the original 8 
asymmetry (Experiment 1), we demonstrate that trial-by-trial carryover of attentional settings is not a 9 
necessary precondition (Experiment 2). The results from Experiment 3 indicate that the cost asymmetry 10 
can be best explained by an associative interference account, against a memory retrieval one. Together, 11 
these results therefor provide evidence in favor of an associative interference account and document that 12 
shielding attention for internal representations from external intrusions is more efficient than the other 13 
way around. This finding advances our understanding of a core aspect of cognitive flexibility and the 14 
relationship between external and internal attention. More research on this question and novel ones raised 15 
by it is necessary, however.16 
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Introduction 1 
Attention can be broadly subdivided into two categories by distinguishing between the main substrates it 2 
acts upon, i.e. external stimuli versus internal representations (Chun et al., 2011; Myers et al., 2017; 3 
Verschooren, Schindler, et al., 2019). Whereas external attention directly depends on currently available 4 
perceptual input, internal attention operates on long-term memory (LTM) representations, which are 5 
considered to enter working memory (WM) once attention is allocated to them (Oberauer, 2002, 2009). 6 
In our interaction with the environment, we often switch attention between both substrates. For example, 7 
when we are looking for a grocery item in the store and, after having found it, we retrieve the next item 8 
on our memorized grocery list, and hence transit from external to internal attention. Even though the 9 
regulation of attention between external stimuli and internal representations is thus clearly central to 10 
successful everyday cognition, relatively little is known currently about the mechanisms involved in 11 
switching attention to and fro between these modes. 12 
Recently, Verschooren and colleagues (Verschooren, Liefooghe, Brass, & Pourtois, 2019) 13 
validated a novel experimental procedure in which participants randomly switch attention between 14 
external stimuli and internal representations on a trial-by-trial basis. After memorizing four figures at the 15 
beginning of the experiment, they performed a probe-to-target matching task where the target figure was 16 
either presented on screen (external trial) or retrieved from memory based on a location cue (internal trial; 17 
see Fig. 1). The trial-to-trial transitions created four conditions of interest: external repetitions, switches 18 
towards external, internal repetitions, and switches towards internal. The authors reported a cost for switch 19 
trials, with participants being slower and more error prone on switch than repetition trials. Furthermore, 20 
this switch cost was clearly asymmetric: it was larger when switching attention to an internal 21 
representation after processing an external stimulus than in the reverse direction. Crucially, despite the 22 
larger switch cost, participants performed internal trials faster than external trials, thereby ruling out a 23 
simple interpretation in terms of asymmetrical task difficulty. 24 
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In the task-switching literature, such a pattern of results has been observed previously when 1 
participants switch between a dominant or highly practiced task and a non-dominant one. For example, in 2 
the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), color words are printed in different color fonts (e.g. the word “blue” printed 3 
in red) and participant respond either to the name of the word (here: blue) or its color (here: red). When 4 
the relevant stimulus dimension on the current trial (e.g. word meaning) is different from that on the 5 
previous trial (e.g. color of the word), a cost is observed compared to a task repetition (e.g. two successive 6 
word naming trials). Crucially, when switching between (more automatic/dominant) word naming and 7 
(less automatic/non-dominant) color naming, participants usually show a larger switch cost when 8 
switching towards word naming, despite the overall reaction time advantage on word naming trials 9 
(Allport et al., 1994). Two important accounts in the task-switching literature, associative interference and 10 
priming, provide competing explanation for this phenomenon. We discuss both in detail below. 11 
It should nonetheless be noted that mapping this pattern onto the findings reported by Verschooren 12 
and colleagues (2019) implies that internal attention is more automatic (or dominant) than external 13 
attention. However, we know of no other prior empirical evidence supporting this idea, and an advantage 14 
for internal over external attention might seem counterintuitive at first sight. Consequently, we cannot 15 
take this assumption for granted. Alternatively, it may be the case that external and internal attention are 16 
not necessarily imbalanced, but instead, memory retrieval differs between them, and hence this factor 17 
would account for this asymmetry. That is, it is usually more difficult to access internal representations 18 
(from memory) than external stimuli (perceptually available), but this retrieval cost may be reduced when 19 
the internal representations are repeated. If this were the case, a larger internal than external switch cost is 20 
expected as well. Even though this account seems to be a priori more plausible, it nonetheless fails to 21 
address the origin of the faster mean response times for internal trials. 22 
The aim of the present study was to adjudicate between these three different explanations. The 23 
common denominator between these three accounts is that they can all provide an explanation for the 24 
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switch cost asymmetry.  In the following, we discuss the two (opposing) task-switching and the memory 1 
retrieval accounts, and their mutually exclusive predictions under specific experimental manipulations, 2 
separately. We then assess these predictions empirically, to take an important step towards better 3 
understanding the processes underlying transitions between external and internal attentional states. 4 
 5 
Associative interference 6 
The associative interference hypothesis is an account developed to explain task-switching costs 7 
(for reviews, see Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). It attributes this cost 8 
to the activation of task-irrelevant (or competing) memory traces in a task-switching context (e.g., Waszak, 9 
Hommel, & Allport, 2003). These traces, more specifically, are automatically encoded into LTM when 10 
engaging with a stimulus, which serves as a retrieval cue during subsequent encounters (Logan, 1988). 11 
Retrieval includes the reactivation of the specific attentional settings (e.g., focusing on the ink color versus 12 
semantic meaning of the stimulus). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that these traces include abstract 13 
control setting as well, such as a flexible versus stable mental state (for recent reviews, see Abrahamse, 14 
Braem, Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016; Braem & Egner, 2018; Chiu & Egner, 2017). For example, Chiu and 15 
Egner (2017) demonstrated that participants show a decreased switch cost for stimuli that were associated 16 
with frequent task switches compared to stimuli associated with low switch frequency. Thus, we similarly 17 
assume that an external or internal attentional focus would be encoded with other trial features (i.e., the 18 
cues and/or target stimuli), and subsequently retrieved by these features; as a consequence, they could 19 
cause interference if retrieved in a situation where the other type of attention is required.  20 
Crucially, interference from the irrelevant attentional setting is especially detrimental on switch 21 
trials, as a WM update takes place, making ongoing performance more susceptible to intrusions  22 
(Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009; Dreisbach & Wenke, 2011). This is in line with an influential model of 23 
WM function, which proposes that its content is controlled by a gating mechanism (Frank et al., 2001; 24 
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Reilly & Frank, 2006). The gate is closed when the content is maintained but opened when it needs to be 1 
updated. In this state, irrelevant stimulus features (and associated actions and attentional states) can enter 2 
WM and have a detrimental effect on task execution. Switch trials are a specific instance of a situation in 3 
which a transition from a maintenance to an updating mode is required, and the gate is opened (Mayr et 4 
al., 2014). As traces for both competing task sets are retrieved in a task-switching context, they can both 5 
access WM and influence behavior. The interference resulting from this competition leads to a switch 6 
cost. 7 
To account for asymmetrical switch costs, the associative interference hypothesis assumes that 8 
dominant and non-dominant task sets differ in the efficiency with which the relevant attentional focus is 9 
shielded (Mayr et al., 2014). When switching between a dominant and non-dominant task, the memory 10 
traces activating the non-dominant attentional focus are usually not sufficiently strong to interfere on 11 
repetition trials of the dominant one. Consequently, robust maintenance prevails. On trials of the non-12 
dominant task, on the other hand, the dominant task can interfere with maintenance of the non-dominant 13 
task set, even when the task is repeated. On switch trials of both tasks, however, WM needs to be updated 14 
with the relevant attentional setting, during which memory traces from the competing task set can interfere 15 
equally for the dominant and non-dominant task. The larger switch cost for the dominant task is caused 16 
by the difference between robust maintenance on repetition and updating on switch trials. 17 
When applied to the cost asymmetry between external and internal switching, this account entails 18 
that the memory traces for their two competing attentional states, i.e., external versus internal attention, 19 
are learned associatively when performing the task. On external repetition trials, external attention suffers 20 
interference from the internal one. On internal repetition trials, on the other hand, internal attention does 21 
not suffer much interference and can be robustly maintained. On switch trials, both attentional states are 22 
affecting behavior, resulting in the large internal and smaller external switch cost. 23 
 24 
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Priming 1 
The task priming or “task set inertia” hypothesis was developed to account for task-switching costs 2 
as well (Allport et al., 1994; Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). The key difference with 3 
the associative interference hypothesis is that it proposes that task sets are carried over from one trial to 4 
the next – often with a recency gradient (Yeung & Monsell, 2003). That is, the cost is not due to retrieval 5 
of competing task sets, but to their positive priming from trial-to-trial, defined as the transient increases 6 
in activation for recently performed tasks (but see Allport et al., 1994 for an inhibition account). 7 
This account has similarly been applied to asymmetrical switch costs between dominant and non-8 
dominant tasks. Yeung and Monsell (2003) argued that priming of task sets interacts differently with 9 
dominant and non-dominant tasks. More specifically, in their model, positive priming is assumed to be 10 
especially strong following trials of the non-dominant task (see also Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). On these 11 
trials, control is required to enhance attention to the relevant stimulus features. On trials of the dominant 12 
task, on the other hand, attention is more automatically allocated to the dominant stimulus features, 13 
without the involvement of additional control (which is assumed to be costly, and therefore minimized 14 
when possible). Together, these opposing effects can explain the cost asymmetry: On non-dominant 15 
repetition and switch trials, interference from the dominant task set’s activation is largely stable. As a 16 
result, there is only a small performance difference on both trial types. On dominant trials, on the other 17 
hand, the amount of interference from the non-dominant task set differs greatly between switch trials, 18 
where control has recently increased the non-dominant task-set’s activation, and repetition trials, where 19 
its activation has returned to a default low state. 20 
We can again use this account to interpret the asymmetric cost for switches between external and 21 
internal attention (Verschooren et al., 2019). According to this account, additional (controlled) activation 22 
of external attention on external trials is required, while internal attention is activated more automatically. 23 
When switching from an external to an internal trial, the resulting additional activation of external 24 
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attention is primed and results in a large switch cost. On external trials, on the other hand, there is a stable 1 
detrimental effect from the more automatic internal attention on both repetition and switch trials. As a 2 
result, no large cost emerges. 3 
 4 
Retrieval cost for switches to memory 5 
In contrast to the two previous accounts, we can also formulate an explanation that does not assume 6 
an imbalance between external and internal attention. That is, one important difference between external 7 
and internal trials is the degree to which they rely on information stored in declarative memory. On internal 8 
trials, accessing and retrieving this information can incur an independent cost. Dark (1990) previously 9 
argued for such an account after observing a cost asymmetry for switches between perceiving individual 10 
letters on screen and retrieving them from memory. Participants performed lists in which letters were 11 
either only perceived or only retrieved to performance on lists where a single switch between them 12 
occurred. Dark (1990) found a cost only for switches towards memory retrieval, which disappeared when 13 
participants were pre-cued and could retrieve the letter in advance. Consequently, she concluded that 14 
switches between perception and memory in themselves did not incur a cost, but memory retrieval did 15 
(but see Carlson, Wenger, & Sullivan, 1993; Verschooren et al., 2019 for methodological limitations). 16 
This memory retrieval account can also be applied to interpret the asymmetric switch cost observed 17 
in the procedure of Verschooren and colleagues (2019) where external and internal trials were intermixed. 18 
That is, we can interpret the larger internal switch cost as resulting from two independently contributing 19 
effects: the switch cost itself and a memory retrieval cost. In this interpretation, the presence of the basic 20 
switch cost is caused either by associative interference or by priming. In addition, specifically on internal 21 
trials, participants need to retrieve the memorized figures from declarative memory. If we further assume 22 
that recently refreshed memories are more accessible for retrieval, an additive memory retrieval cost 23 
during this switch can explain the larger switch cost for internal trials. This assumption entails that the 24 
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memory retrieval cost will be especially large when switching to internal trials, compared to internal 1 
repetitions. In this situation, the internal representations have not recently been refreshed and need to be 2 
actively retrieved. In other words, even though there is a similar cost for the switch itself on both external 3 
and internal switch trials, an additional memory retrieval cost is present on internal switch trials, which 4 
would drive the larger cost observed there. 5 
 6 
The current study 7 
The three accounts discussed above, i.e. associative interference, priming, and memory retrieval, 8 
have competing predictions under specific experimental settings. These predictions relate specifically to 9 
the relative magnitude of the switch costs (i.e., their asymmetry). According to the priming hypothesis, 10 
the cost asymmetry will be present only when participants switch between external and internal trials 11 
within a mixed block. The associative interference hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that the 12 
asymmetry will be present even in blocks where only external or only internal trials are presented, as long 13 
as participants have previously learned the association between bottom-up stimulus features and both 14 
(external and internal) attentional states. Finally, the memory retrieval account predicts that a cost 15 
asymmetry will be present whenever a switch to an internal trial takes place, independent of any prior 16 
associations. 17 
We tested these different predictions in a series of three experiments. Experiment 1 was a 18 
replication attempt of the switch cost asymmetry previously observed in a mixed-block design 19 
(Verschooren et al., 2019). The three accounts predict that we would find a cost asymmetry in this 20 
experiment. In Experiment 2, participants alternated between pure blocks of either external or internal 21 
trials. On a subset of the trials, participants were interrupted by an unrelated task that required them to 22 
solve a simple mathematical equation. In this design, a priming account predicts no asymmetry, as there 23 
are no trial-to-trial transitions between the attentional states (see also Mayr et al., 2014). That is, as there 24 
10 
 
is no additional external activation preceding an internal switch trial, the internal switch cost should be 1 
reduced, blunting the interaction effect. The other two accounts do predict a cost asymmetry, as in this 2 
design traces for the competing attentional states are present (associative interference) and switches 3 
towards internal representations occur (memory retrieval).  Finally, Experiment 3 was a between-subjects 4 
design, where one group received external trials only and the other internal trials only. Here again, 5 
participant performed the mathematical task on a subset of trials. With this design, there is no opportunity 6 
to form associations of the competing attentional state, so the associative interference account predicts 7 
that the cost asymmetry would be absent in this experiment. More specifically, as the external repetition 8 
trials suffer less from the internal interference, the external switch cost should increase. Conversely, as 9 
the internal repetition trials never suffered from external interference, the magnitude of the internal switch 10 
cost should stay the same. Memory retrieval, on the other hand, assumes that the external switch cost 11 
should remain small and the internal one larger, resulting from the (effortful) retrieval operation. To 12 
summarize, in Experiment 2 we can compare the predictions from the priming account with the other two 13 
accounts. In Experiment 3, associative interference and memory retrieval can be pitted against each other. 14 
11 
 
 1 
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. A. External training phase. Participants decided whether the figure 2 
above (probe) matched the figure selected in a blue frame, until they reached the accuracy criterion (both >.85 and 3 
at least 18 total correct trials). B. Internal training phase. Participants memorized four figures and their locations. 4 
On each trial, they decided whether the figure above (probe) was in the selected location (in blue) for the memorized 5 
set. The same accuracy criterion was used. C. Experimental task: On each trial, participant decided whether the 6 
selected figure (in blue) matched the centrally presented probe. The selected figure was either presented on screen 7 
(external trial; first in sequence) or retrieved from the figures memorized in 1B based on the selected location 8 
(internal trial; last two). We were interested in the four possible trial-to-trial transitions: External-Repetition (E-R), 9 
External-Switch (E-S), Internal-Repetition (I-R), or Internal-Switch (I-S).10 
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Experiment 1 1 
Participants 2 
We recruited 47 participants on Amazon Turk, an online recruiting platform. The sample size was 3 
motivated by an a priori power analysis to detect a small effect size (partial η2 of 0.04) in a Repeated 4 
Measures Analysis of Variance with 85% power, which revealed a required sample size of 39 (see also 5 
Verschooren et al., 2019). We accepted data submission for participants that performed at >75%1 accuracy 6 
on the experimental task, which resulted in the rejection of six participants (final sample of 41 7 
participants)2. Participants signed informed consents and received $3.3 for participation. 8 
 9 
Methods 10 
Materials 11 
The experiment was programmed in JavaScript, using the jQuery library (see https://osf.io/t8ery/ 12 
for the experiment script). The stimuli were 16 non-verbalizable figures from a larger set of stimuli created 13 
by Endo and colleagues (Endo et al., 2003). These black figures were 60 by 60 pixels on a white 14 
background screen (900 x 900 pixels). In each run, two sets of four figures were used (one set for the 15 
external and another one for the internal trials). The same two sets were used for half of the participants 16 
and two other sets for the other half. For each participant, the set used for the internal and external trials 17 
was randomized. 18 
 19 
 20 
                                                           
1 This criterion was chosen to screen out participants that did not memorize the figures and answered randomly on this 
part of the task, which could theoretically result in an average accuracy of 75% (100% on external trials and 50% on internal 
ones). 
2 Demographic information for the participants was not saved due to a technical error. Difallah and colleagues 
(Difallah, Filatova, Ipeirotis, 2018) recently investigated the demographic characteristics of Amazon Turk workers and reported 
a mean age of approximately 35 years old and an approximately balanced gender ratio. We have found this consistently as well 
in other (unpublished) experiments with similar sample sizes and in the published literature (e.g. Whitehead & Egner, 2017). 
Hence, we operate under the assumption that this describes the current samples. 
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Procedure 1 
The experiment began with a training phase, which consisted of an external and internal training 2 
task (their order was counterbalanced over participants). The external training task was not strictly 3 
necessary to be able to carry out the perceptual trials of the main task, but was included to equate the 4 
amount of practice for the external and internal stimuli (see Verschooren et al, 2019, Experiment 2). On 5 
each external training trial, a square was presented with one of the external figures in each of its four 6 
compartments for 15s or until response (see Fig. 1A). The locations of these figures were randomized on 7 
each trial. One of the four figures would be highlighted in a blue frame, indicating that this figure was the 8 
target figure. Simultaneously as well, one of the figures (the probe) would be presented above the square. 9 
Participants had to decide whether the target figure was identical to the probe figure. The internal training 10 
task began with the presentation of the four figures of the internal set (see Fig. 1B). Participants pressed 11 
the space bar after memorizing these figures and their locations to continue to the internal training phase 12 
(or after 15s had passed). Each internal training trial started with a 350ms fixation cross (to remove the 13 
after-image of the correct stimulus-location associations presented following an error, see below). Similar 14 
to the external training phase, for 15s (or until response), a square with four compartments was presented 15 
on each trial, with one of them highlighted in a blue frame (the target location) and one of the four figures 16 
from the external set above presented above the square (the probe). Different to the perceptual training, 17 
however, the compartments of the square were filled with question marks. Participants needed to retrieve 18 
the figure that was in the target location from memory and decide whether this figure was identical to the 19 
probe figure. If participants made a mistake, the four figures were presented on screen for 5s to allow re-20 
encoding of the correct stimulus-location associations. Participants moved on to the experiment proper 21 
(the practice and main task) once their accuracy was higher than .85 on each of these tasks (and at least 22 
18 trials were performed correctly in total). This criterion was set to assure that all participants memorized 23 
the set sufficiently (and equally). 24 
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In the experimental task, each trial started with a 250ms fixation cross, after which a square (with 1 
four compartments) appeared on either side of it for 300ms (See Fig 1C). One of the squares would contain 2 
four figures (perceptual set) and the other one four question marks (cues for LTM set). The locations of 3 
these external figures were randomized on each trial. Simultaneously, two arrows, one above and one 4 
below the fixation cross, would point to the relevant square for that trial (figures and question marks on 5 
perceptual and memory trials, respectively). At the same time, one of the four compartments in this square 6 
would be highlighted in a blue frame, indicating that this was the target that needed to be matched to the 7 
probe. On external trials, the target figure was presented on screen. On internal trials, participants needed 8 
to use the target location as a cue to retrieve the figure previously memorized in this location (see next 9 
paragraph). Finally, after this 300ms window, a central probe replaced the fixation cross (all other stimuli 10 
remained on screen), which needed to be compared by the participants to the target. This final screen was 11 
presented for 2500ms or until response. 12 
For both the training tasks and experimental task, participants responded with the “d”-key if the 13 
target and probe were identical and “k”-key if they were not. This response mapping was counterbalanced 14 
over participants. Participants received feedback after each trial of the training tasks and after each trial of 15 
the practice block of the experimental task. After each block, they received feedback on their accuracy in 16 
that block. 17 
The main experiment consisted of one practice block and eight experimental blocks. In each block, 18 
there were 2 warm-up trials and 80 experimental trials. Trial order was counterbalanced within each bock 19 
to create an equal number of trials in each of the four conditions. In addition, for each of these conditions, 20 
there was an equal number of match and mismatch trials (probe-target compatibility). On each trial, there 21 
was a .50 chance for the perceptual figures to appear on the left or right side and a .25 chance for each of 22 
the four locations to be the target (immediate repetitions of target position or probe were excluded). The 23 
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order of the nine blocks was randomized for each participant, but the trial sequence within these blocks 1 
was pre-defined to meet the above restrictions. 2 
Design 3 
The task formed a repeated-measures 2 (Modality: external, internal) x 2 (Switch: repeat, switch) 4 
factorial design. The figures were presented on screen and retrieved from memory on external and internal 5 
trials, respectively. On repetition trials, the Modality of the current trial was the same as that on the 6 
preceding trial versus different on switch trials. This design resulted in four conditions: External-7 
Repetition (Ext-Rep), External-Switch (Ext-Swi), Internal-Repetition (Int-Rep), and Internal-Switch (Int-8 
Swi). The main dependent variables were the response times (RT) and error rates (ER) in each condition. 9 
  10 
Data Analysis 11 
The raw data and analysis scripts can be found online (https://osf.io/t8ery/). We removed the 12 
practice trials, the trials of the external and internal training phase, and the first two trials from each 13 
experimental block. In addition, we removed trials on which an error was made and those preceded by an 14 
error. The data were preprocessed and visualized using the tidyverse (Wickham, 2017) and ggplot2 15 
(Wickham, 2016) libraries in R (R core team, 2018; version 1.1.456). 16 
Participant had very low error rates (ER; sample mean around .05 in the least accurate condition) 17 
and there was no evidence for a speed–accuracy trade-off (see Table 1), so we focused the analysis on 18 
response times (RT). We analyzed the data with a Bayesian generalized linear multilevel model 19 
(BGLMM) approach, using the brms (Bürkner, 2017) and emmeans (Lenth, 2018) libraries. When there 20 
are repeated observations for each participant, a linear multilevel model is preferable over ordinary linear 21 
regression, as it considers variability at different levels of the dataset and allows them to inform each other 22 
(McElreath, 2016; Nalborczyk et al., 2018). Moreover, it is advisable to use a GLMM when analyzing RT 23 
data, which are rarely normally distributed and often show a skewed distribution (Lo & Andrews, 2015; 24 
16 
 
Speelman & McGann, 2013). We opted for a GLMM with an inverse Gaussian with natural logarithmic 1 
function, which we previously found to describe RT data on this type of protocol best (Verschooren, 2 
Liefooghe, et al., 2019). Finally, we specified the model using a full random structure, as has been 3 
recommended in the literature (see Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). That is, in addition to estimating 4 
the group-level effects for Modality, Switch, and their interaction, we estimated these effects for each 5 
participant as well. 6 
Within this model, we then looked at the presence or absence of the fixed effects of interest. We 7 
provide the model summary (fixed effects) and planned contrasts, which give the model estimate of the 8 
switch cost for external and internal trials. As the model estimates are not in the response scale, we back-9 
transformed them using the emmeans package. For all effects, we present the 95% high probability density 10 
interval (HPDI) of the posterior distribution. 11 
We analyzed the data in a Bayesian framework because our critical test consisted of detecting 12 
evidence for the presence or absence of the interaction effect. Within a Bayesian framework, evidence in 13 
favor of or against the null-hypothesis can be obtained in the form of a Bayes Factor (BF). We obtained 14 
BFs using the Savage-Dickey density ratio method from the brms package (see Wagenmakers et al., 2010). 15 
This method is very sensitive to the specific prior set by the researcher, so we used weakly informative 16 
priors on the fixed effects (a normal distribution centered around 0 with a standard deviation of 0.03). The 17 
BF testing for evidence in favor of or against the null hypothesis then represents the amount of posterior 18 
updating after the data are fit by the model. In addition to these BFs, we use a region of practical 19 
equivalence (ROPE), which is less reliant on priors. Kruschke (2018) suggests to set the width of the 20 
ROPE to -0.1 to 0.1 times the standard deviation of the posterior distribution, corresponding to a negligible 21 
effect size. We used 0.2 as a more conservative estimate, but this cutoff did not influence the results. If 22 
the 89% CI falls completely outside the ROPE, we can conclude that we have a non-negligible effect. 23 
 24 
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Table 1 
Reaction times and error rates for Experiment 1-3 
Exp. Src. Seq RT (SD) ER (SD) RT Cost ER Cost 
1 
Ext Rep 815 (165) .03 (.04) 36 .01 
Swi 851 (177) .04 (.05) 
Int Rep 912 (204) .07 (.06) 59 .01 
Swi 971 (212) .08 (.06)  
2 
Ext Rep 744 (113) .03 (.03) 52 .00 
Swi 796 (136) .03 (.03) 
Int Rep 875 (154) .05 (.04) 80 .01 
Swi 955 (184) .06 (.05) 
3 
Ext Rep 822 (176) .03 (.04) 62 .01 
Swi 884 (194) .04 (.04) 
Int Rep 885 (194) .05 (.06) 72 .01 
Swi 957 (209) .06 (.07) 
 1 
 2 
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Results 1 
 2 
Figure 2. Response times for Experiment 1. In black: Mean response time and 95% confidence interval 3 
(CI). In white: individual participants’ means. A. External-Repetition (E-R), External-Switch (Ext-Swi), 4 
Internal-Repetition (Int-Rep) and Internal-Switch (Int-Swi) condition. B. Switch cost for External (Ext-5 
Swi > Ext-Rep) and Internal (Int-Swi > Int-Rep). C. The (transformed) model estimates for the fixed 6 
effects. The thick line and error bars represent the 55% and 95% HPDI, respectively. D. The prior (light 7 
blue) and posterior (dark blue) distribution for the interaction effect. The BF (12.9) represents their ratio 8 
for the hypothesis that there is an interaction effect. The ROPE (orange) and 89% HDPI (blue) do not 9 
overlap (see Krusche, 2018). 10 
 11 
The model summary revealed a main effect for Modality (β = 0.079, 95% HPDI = [0.046;0.109]) 12 
and for Switch (β = 0.038, 95% HPDI = [0.025;0.051]; see Fig. 2C). More specifically, participants were 13 
slower on internal than external trials and on switch than repetition trials (see Fig. 2A). Crucially, the 14 
interaction effect was present as well, providing evidence for the switch cost asymmetry (β = 0.023, 95% 15 
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HPDI = [0.007;0.039]; see Fig. 2B-C). Converted back to the response scale, the model estimated the 1 
intercepts of the conditions to be 805ms (95% HPDI = [754;860]), 836ms (95% HDI = [781;893]), 871ms 2 
(95% HPDI = [811;933]), and 926ms (95% HPDI = [862;993]) for Ext-Rep, Ext-Swi, Int-Rep, and Int-3 
Swi, respectively. Planned contrasts for the effect of Switch in both Modalities revealed that the switch 4 
cost was indeed asymmetric in the expected direction, with a smaller cost when switching attention to 5 
external stimuli (31ms, 95% HPDI = [21;41]) than to internal representations (55ms, 95% HPDI = [42;68]; 6 
see Fig. 2). Crucially, when we look at the BF (12.9), we can conclude that we have strong evidence in 7 
favor of the presence of an interaction effect (Kass & Raftery, 1995; see Fig. 2D). This agrees with the 8 
evidence gathered through the ROPE as well, which falls completely outside the 89% HPDI (see Fig. 2D). 9 
 10 
Discussion 11 
In Experiment 1, participants responded more slowly when the modality (external versus internal) 12 
of the current trial was different than the modality of the previous one, compared to a repetition. Moreover, 13 
the model estimated this cost as larger when switching towards internal (55ms) than external (31ms) trials. 14 
In other words, we replicated the asymmetric cost (BF = 12.9) for these switches reported in Verschooren 15 
and colleagues (2019).3 16 
In the Introduction, we presented three competing hypotheses that could account for this 17 
asymmetry, i.e. associative interference, priming, and memory retrieval. The associative interference 18 
account predicts that the asymmetry occurs whenever participants had the opportunity to learn both 19 
competing attentional settings and an interruption takes place (which does not have to be the competing 20 
task). The priming account, on the other hand, states that trial-to-trial transitions between both competing 21 
attentional settings are a necessary precondition. The memory retrieval account, finally, claims that the 22 
                                                           
3 This replication was successful despite profound differences in the sample pool characteristics (Amazon Turk 
participants primarily from USA and India versus undergraduate psychology students from Belgium) and minor changes in the 
experimental protocol (most notably the amount and presentation of the training phases and the order of the target-probe 
appearance, see Verschooren, Liefooghe, Brass, & Pourtois, 2019). This further demonstrates the robustness of this effect. 
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asymmetry will be present whenever participants switch towards an internal trial. In Experiment 2, we 1 
pitted the priming hypothesis against the other two hypotheses by evaluating whether trial-to-trial 2 
carryover of attentional settings is a necessary condition for the cost asymmetry to occur. More 3 
specifically, in Experiment 2, participants carried out pure blocks of either perceptual or memory trials 4 
and were occasionally interrupted by a third, independent task in which they solved simple math equations. 5 
If we were to observe larger costs in the internal blocks than perceptual blocks, we would be able to infer 6 
that carryover of attentional settings from one modality to the other is not a necessary condition for the 7 
asymmetry. 8 
21 
 
Experiment 2 1 
Participants 2 
54 participants were recruited through Amazon Turk (see power analysis Experiment 1). We 3 
rejected nine participants with accuracy lower than 75% (45 included). Participants signed informed 4 
consent and received $3.3 for participation. 5 
 6 
Methods 7 
Materials 8 
Materials were the same as in Experiment 1 (see https://osf.io/t8ery/ for the experiment script). 9 
For the interrupting task, we used a list of simple mathematical equations (Vassena et al., 2014). 10 
Procedure  11 
The training task and experimental trials were identical to Experiment 1. However, on one in four 12 
experimental trials, a simple mathematical equation followed the probe-to-target matching. These trials 13 
consisted of a single screen in which three digits needed to be added (“A + B + C = ?”). On each trial, one 14 
correct and one incorrect solution was provided (“Press the ‘d’-key if the correct answer is X and press 15 
the ‘k’-key if the correct answer is Y”). The correct result never exceeded 9 and the incorrect answer 16 
differed by 1 or 2 from the correct one. This interrupting task was taken from earlier research addressing 17 
a similar question (Mayer et al., 2014) and arguably relies on both external and internal attention. 18 
Participants responded with the “d”- and “k”-key on all trials (counterbalanced over participants), 19 
but there was no consistent response mapping for correct and incorrect trials on the interrupting task. That 20 
is, on each of these trials two response options were provided: “Press ‘d’-key if answer is X and ‘k’ is 21 
answer is Y,” and the correct response (X versus Y) differed from trial-to-trial. 22 
 23 
 24 
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Design 1 
The same independent variables were used as in Experiment 1 (Modality and Switch), but 2 
Modality was alternated from block-to-block instead of trial-to-trial. For the Switch variable, switch trials 3 
were those preceded by the interrupting task and repetition trials those that were not. The dependent 4 
variables were RT and ER in the different conditions. 5 
The experiment consisted of two practice blocks (one external and one internal) and eight 6 
experimental blocks (four external and four internal). The block order alternated between external and 7 
internal, but their sequence was counterbalanced over participants (A-B versus B-A). Each trial had a .25 8 
chance to be followed by the interrupting task (160 experimental trials). Within each block, there was an 9 
equal number of trials following the interruption form each Modality (10 per Modality per block). For 10 
these trials, there was an equal number of match and mismatch responses for each Modality. Side of 11 
presentation, probe identity, and target location were randomized as in Experiment 1. 12 
The training tasks were the same as in Experiment 1 and were provided two times for each block 13 
type (i.e. once before the practice block and first experimental block for each Modality).  14 
 15 
Data Analysis 16 
The same preprocessing steps were taken as in Experiment 1 (see https://osf.io/t8ery/). In addition, 17 
the interrupting task trials and experimental trials following an error on the interrupting task were 18 
removed. The same BGLMM analysis with a full random model was used. 19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
 24 
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Results 1 
 2 
Figure 3. Response times for Experiment 2. In black: Mean response time and 95% confidence interval 3 
(CI). In white: individual participants’ means. A. Ext-Rep, Ext-Swi, Int-Rep and Int-Swi) condition. B. 4 
Switch cost for External (Ext-Swi > Ext-Rep) and Internal (Int-Swi > Int-Rep). C. The (transformed) 5 
model estimates for the fixed effects. The thick line and error bars represent the 55% and 95% HPDI, 6 
respectively. D. The prior (light blue) and posterior (dark blue) distribution for the interaction effect. The 7 
BF (3.5) represents their ratio for the hypothesis that there is an interaction effect. The ROPE (orange) 8 
and 89% HDPI (blue) do not overlap (see Krusche, 2018). 9 
 10 
The model summary revealed a main effect for Modality (β = 0.111,  95% HPDI = [0.074;0.144]) 11 
and for Switch (β = 0.055, 95% HPDI = [0.0.034;0.075]; see Fig. 3C), with participants being slower on 12 
internal and switch trials compared to external and repetition trials, respectively (see Fig. 3A). In addition, 13 
an interaction effect was present as well (β = 0.020, 95% HPDI = [0.002;0.038], see Fig. 3B-C). The 14 
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model estimated the intercepts for Ext-Rep, Ext-Swi, Int-Rep, and Int-Swi to be 743ms (95% HPDI = 1 
[708;780]), 786ms (95% HPDI = [744;828]), 831ms (95% HPDI = [784;877]), and 897ms (95% HPDI = 2 
[839;951]), respectively. Planned contrasts revealed that the switch cost was indeed asymmetric in the 3 
expected direction, with a smaller cost to switch towards external trials (42ms, 95% HPDI = [27;57]) than 4 
to internal trials (65ms, 95% HPDI = [46;82]). From the BF (3.5), we can conclude that there is substantial 5 
evidence in favor of the interaction effect (Kass & Raftery, 1995; see Fig. 3D). Here again, this conclusion 6 
is further corroborated by the lack of overlap between the ROPE and the 89% HPDI (see Fig. 3D).  7 
 8 
Discussion 9 
In Experiment 2, we tested the competing predictions of the priming hypothesis versus the 10 
associative interference and memory retrieval hypotheses. Participants switched between external and 11 
internal blocks and were occasionally interrupted to solve a mathematical equation. The priming 12 
hypothesis predicted no switch cost asymmetry in this situation, as there was no opportunity for trial-by-13 
trial carryover of attentional settings from external to internal and vice versa. The associative interference 14 
and memory retrieval hypotheses, in contrast, both predicted the presence of a cost asymmetry (see 15 
Introduction). We found clear statistical evidence for the latter result, with a larger switch cost for internal 16 
(80ms) than external (52ms) trials. Even though the evidence is less strong compared to Experiment 1, it 17 
is still substantial however (BF = 3.5). Therefore, we can reasonably exclude the priming account as a 18 
viable explanation for this asymmetry. 19 
However, we cannot yet distinguish between the other two competing accounts, as both had their 20 
prediction of the presence of an interaction effect confirmed in Experiment 2. Under certain experimental 21 
settings, they nonetheless have opposing predictions. The associative interference hypothesis proposes 22 
that the cost asymmetry results from worse shielding against competing attentional states on Ext-Rep than 23 
Int-Rep trials. In other words, if there is no opportunity to learn these competing attentional states, the 24 
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asymmetry should disappear. The memory retrieval hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that switching 1 
towards internal representations will always (e.g., even though a competing attentional state, here external, 2 
is not activated) be more costly than switching to external stimuli. To adjudicate between these two 3 
accounts, we used a between-subjects design in Experiment 3 (with one group of participants that 4 
performed solely external blocks and the other one solely internal blocks) because it allowed us to explore 5 
the behavior of the switch cost under pure experimental conditions, i.e., participants in each group had no 6 
experience whatsoever with the other attentional set and thus, a modulation of the switch cost across the 7 
two main conditions/groups could not be explained by the presence of  this competing attentional set. If 8 
we were to find no cost asymmetry in Experiment 3, we would be able to reject the memory retrieval 9 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the associative interference hypothesis predicts that the external switch cost will 10 
actually become larger in this situation than Experiment 1 because participants could better shield external 11 
attention on Ext-Rep trials (i.e. faster RTs on Ext-Rep trials). In other words, if the asymmetry were to 12 
disappear because the external cost increases, this would be considered strong evidence in support of the 13 
associative interference hypothesis. 14 
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Experiment 3 1 
Participants 2 
We recruited 91 participants on Amazon Turk, 47 and 44 for the external and internal condition, 3 
respectively. This sample size was based on an a priori power analysis in G*Power to find a small effect 4 
size (partial η2 of 0.03) in a RM ANOVA with a within-between interaction with 85% power, which 5 
revealed a required sample size of 76 participants. Six were excluded in the external condition and three 6 
in the internal conditions, resulting in 41 participants in each condition. Participants signed informed 7 
consent and received $3.3 for participation. 8 
 9 
Methods 10 
Materials, procedure, and design 11 
The materials from Experiment 2 were also used in Experiment 3. The design from Experiment 2 12 
was adapted to a between-subjects one, but was otherwise identical. In the external condition, participants 13 
carried out one practice block and eight experimental blocks of the external trials. Before the practice 14 
block and first block, they received the external training task. The participants in the internal condition 15 
did the same for the internal trials and the internal training task. 16 
 17 
Data Analysis 18 
The data preprocessing and analysis was identical as in Experiment 2 (see https://osf.io/t8ery/).    19 
 20 
Results 21 
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 1 
Figure 4. Response times for Experiment 3. In black: Mean response time and 95% confidence interval 2 
(CI). In white: individual participants’ means. A. Ext-Rep, Ext-Swi, Int-Rep and Int-Swi condition. B. 3 
Switch cost for External (Ext-Swi > Ext-Rep) and Internal (Int-Swi > Int-Rep). C. The (transformed) 4 
model estimates for the fixed effects. The thick line and error bars represent the 55% and 96% HPDI, 5 
respectively. D. The prior (light blue) and posterior (dark blue) distribution for the interaction effect. The 6 
BF (0.8) represents their ratio for the hypothesis that there is an interaction effect. The ROPE (orange) 7 
and 89% HDPI (blue) do not overlap (see Krusche, 2018). 8 
 9 
The model showed a significant main effect for Switch (β = 0.065, 95% HDI = [0.046;0.083], see 10 
Fig. 4C), with participants being slower on switch than repetition trials (see Fig 4A). The effect for 11 
Modality (β = 0.020,  95% HDI = [-0.030;0.070]) and the interaction between these two factors (β = 0.013, 12 
95% HDI = [-0.010;0.036]) were not present, however (see Fig. 4A-C). The model estimated the intercepts 13 
at 826ms (95% HDI = [780;870]), 881ms (95% HDI = [831;932]), 843ms (95% HDI = [796;889]), and 14 
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911ms (95% HDI = [859;962]) for the Ext-Rep, Ext-Swi, Int-Rep, and Int-Swi trials. The  external switch 1 
cost was estimated at 56ms (95% HDI = [40;71]) and the internal one at 68ms (95% HDI = [56;81]). 2 
Crucially, compared to Experiments 1 and 2, the BF (0.8) changes direction and no longer provides 3 
evidence in favor of the presence of an interaction (see Fig. 4D). This is confirmed by the ROPE, which 4 
falls completely within the 89% HPDI. The evidence in favor of the absence of an interaction is not 5 
conclusive, however. 6 
 7 
Discussion 8 
Experiment 3 was designed to adjudicate between rival predictions of the associative interference 9 
and memory retrieval hypotheses. To this aim, a between-subjects experimental design was used. 10 
According to the associative interference account, no cost asymmetry should emerge, as there was no 11 
opportunity to learn (and subsequently retrieve) competing attentional states. The memory retrieval 12 
account, on the other hand, did predict an asymmetry, as switching towards memory should always be 13 
more costly than switching towards perception. Whereas we again found a robust switch cost in 14 
Experiment 3, this cost was no longer asymmetric. However, the current data do not allow us to claim 15 
evidence in favor of the absence of the interaction, even though the evidence is going in that direction (BF 16 
= 0.8). 17 
Notwithstanding this caveat, two additional pieces of evidence in favor of an associative 18 
interference account are worth noting here. First, the cost on external trials actually increased in this 19 
experiment compared to the two previous ones (see Fig. 5). This was confirmed by two-sided independent 20 
samples T-Tests, which showed that there was no difference between the magnitude of the external switch 21 
cost in Experiment 1 and 2 (31ms vs. 42ms; T84 = -1.35, p = 0.18, Cohen’s d = -0.29). This cost was 22 
statistically different between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 (31ms vs. 56ms; T80 = -3.79, p < 0.001, 23 
Cohen’s d = -0.84). Between Experiment 2 and 3 it was numerically different and trending towards 24 
29 
 
significance (42ms vs. 56ms; T84 = -1.79, p = 0.07, Cohen’s d = -0.39). This is a counterintuitive finding 1 
that was predicted exclusively by the associative interference hypothesis, i.e. it naturally follows from the 2 
more efficient shielding on Ext-Rep trials when no competing attentional states are stored. The memory 3 
retrieval account, on the other hand, would predict that the external (and internal) switch costs are 4 
equivalent in all experiments, which is not what we observed. 5 
Second, there were no differences in the magnitude of the internal switch costs in Experiment 1-3 6 
(Ts < 1.62, ps > 0.11). This finding serves as an argument against an alternative interpretation at the 7 
methodological level. That is, one might argue that an important remaining difference between 8 
Experiment 1 and 2, on the one hand, and Experiment 3, on the other, is that participants in the internal 9 
condition of Experiment 1 and 2 sometimes needed to attend to the external stimuli. This in turn might 10 
have disrupted the stable maintenance of the internal representations and resulted in an increased internal 11 
retrieval cost when switching towards them (as the memory retrieval account predicts as well). In 12 
Experiment 3, participants did not have to attend the external stimuli, so, following this reasoning, internal 13 
maintenance would not have suffered. This would reduce the internal switch cost in Experiment 3, blunting 14 
the interaction effect. However, what we actually observe is that the internal switch cost stays the same 15 
and external one increases. Here again, the associative interference account predicts that the internal cost 16 
should not be affected by the presence or absence of external trials. Overall, we therefore conclude that 17 
the statistical evidence gathered in Experiment 3 favors the associative interference over the memory 18 
retrieval account. 19 
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General Discussion 1 
In this series of experiments, we aimed to contrast three rival accounts for the finding that even 2 
though participants are faster on internal than external attention trials, they show a larger cost when 3 
switching attention to internal representations than to external stimuli. These accounts, i.e. associative 4 
interference, priming, and memory retrieval, make different predictions under specific experimental 5 
settings. More specifically, the priming hypothesis predicts a larger cost for switching attention to internal 6 
representations than to external stimuli only when an internal trial is preceded by an external trial, and 7 
vice versa. The associative interference account, on the other hand, hypothesizes that the asymmetry 8 
occurs in updating situations in which associations have been previously learned between bottom-up 9 
stimulus features and competing (external and internal) attentional settings for that stimulus. According 10 
to this account, if there are no competing traces, then no cost asymmetry arises. Finally, the memory 11 
retrieval account predicts that the cost to switch to an internal representation will systematically be larger 12 
than that to switch to an external stimulus, as an additive memory retrieval process takes place, and this, 13 
irrespective of the presence or absence of a competing attentional set. Crucially, whereas the first two 14 
accounts rely on the assumption that there is an imbalance between external and internal attention, the 15 
third one does not. We pitted these predictions against each other in three experiments and found that the 16 
data could be best explained in terms of an associative interference account. Even though we are cautious 17 
in drawing definite conclusions on the basis of these data alone, these novel findings raise some intriguing 18 
research questions, as discussed below. 19 
In Experiment 1, we attempted to replicate using an online experiment (by means of Amazon 20 
Mechanical Turk) as opposed to a lab experiment (Verschooren et al., 2019), the cost asymmetry found 21 
previously when participant switched randomly on a trial-by-trial basis between external and internal trials 22 
in mixed blocks. We found that participants show a cost when switching between external stimuli and 23 
internal representations and that this cost was indeed larger for switching attention towards internal 24 
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representations (model estimate: 55ms) than towards external stimuli (31ms; see Fig. 5A), thereby closely 1 
replicating Verschooren and colleagues (2019). Experiment 2 was designed to arbitrate between the 2 
associative interference and memory retrieval hypotheses on the one hand and the priming hypothesis on 3 
the other. All participants alternated between pure blocks of either external or internal trials and solved a 4 
simple mathematical equation on a subset of trials. We found a switch cost asymmetry following this 5 
interruption that was estimated at 65ms when switching towards an internal representation and 42ms when 6 
switching towards an external stimulus (see Fig. 5B). This finding excludes priming as a plausible 7 
explanation of the cost asymmetry, as trial-by-trial switching is a necessary condition for this account. 8 
Finally, Experiment 3 was used to disentangle the associative interference from the memory retrieval 9 
account. Half of the participants were exclusively confronted with external trials while the other half 10 
exclusively with internal trials, a between-subjects manipulation which ensured that external and internal 11 
attentional settings did not compete or interfere with each other. Here again, participants solved simple 12 
mathematical equations on a subset of the trials. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, we found no statistical 13 
evidence for a cost asymmetry following the interruptions in this experiment (the switch cost was 14 
estimated at 68ms and 56ms for internal and external trials, respectively; see Fig. 5C), which allows us to 15 
exclude memory retrieval as a viable explanation for the asymmetry. However, even though the BF 16 
reversed direction towards favoring the null, the evidence provided by it was not conclusive (BF = 0.8). 17 
That being said, the associative interference account also predicted that the external switch cost would 18 
become larger in this single task design (compared to situations where the other task had also been 19 
experienced, as in Experiments 1 and 2), which is precisely what we observed (see Fig. 5). That is, 20 
according to this account, the smaller cost in a mixed task design is not due to the fact that switching 21 
towards external stimuli might be easier, but instead to less efficient (or more difficult) shielding on 22 
external repetition trials. In a single task design, there are no competing attentional states that can trigger 23 
updating attempts during this inefficient shielding, but the RTs on switch trials are not affected (as 24 
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updating is still required here). This increased cost is not something one would intuitively expect in a 1 
single task setting otherwise, as one would expect that it is less effortful to return to the main task. In 2 
addition, the internal switch cost was not smaller in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1 and 2, which 3 
excludes further alternative explanations in terms of a disruption of internal maintenance by the external 4 
stimuli (see Discussion Experiment 3). 5 
Taken together, these results therefore provide strong evidence against a priming and some 6 
evidence against a memory retrieval account, and for the associative interference hypothesis. To 7 
recapitulate (see Introduction), associative interference proposes that three conditions need to be met for 8 
a cost asymmetry to arise: (i) memory traces for both competing attentional states have been paired to 9 
stimulus features and are automatically retrieved when the stimulus is encountered; (ii) the WM gate is 10 
opened when transitioning to an updating mode, allowing both traces to simultaneously enter; (iii) when 11 
the gate is closed, the more dominant attentional state can efficiently shield against interference from the 12 
other, but not the other way around. When these three conditions are met, the cost asymmetry results from 13 
the large difference between efficient shielding on repetition trials and inefficient shielding on switch trials 14 
for one task and the inefficient shielding on both repetition and switch trials for the other. In the paradigm 15 
used here, the actual interference is likely driven by the associative encoding of an external and internal 16 
attentional focus with a certain spatial location in the stimulus array, as the same locations are used on 17 
external and internal trials. Subsequently, when such a location is selected on a trial, both attentional foci 18 
are activated and (asymmetrically) interfere with one another. 19 
One observation nonetheless deserves further attention. Our theoretical framing in the introduction 20 
was strongly influenced by the findings presented in Verschooren and colleagues (2019). These authors 21 
observed a larger cost for switches towards internal representations, but faster RTs on internal trials in 22 
general. This pattern of results suggested the existence of dominant vs. non-dominant attentional sets (see 23 
Introduction section) and partly motivated the current study. In the series of experiments reported here, 24 
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however, we did not find a general RT benefit for internal trials – even though the cost asymmetry 1 
remained. As a matter of fact, participants were faster on external trials in Experiments 1 and 2. This might 2 
be due to a reduction in the number of training phases administered to the participants. Whereas a (external 3 
and internal) training phase was administered before each block in Verschooren et al. (2019), here we did 4 
it only before the practice and first block. As the internal training is arguably more task-relevant, given 5 
the importance of the learned stimulus-location associations for performing the task, compared to mere 6 
stimulus familiarization in the external case, this may have affected the response speed of the participants 7 
(in general). Hence, although training could potentially influence performance (especially on internal 8 
trials), it appears that this effect can be dissociated from that related to switches between external and 9 
internal attention, likely caused by associative interference. The asymmetry we observe, then, might be 10 
more inherent and stem from the enhanced shielding of internal compared to external attention, as our new 11 
results suggest. In this context, it should also be noted that this main effect (general response speed 12 
difference between internal and external conditions) was never of theoretical interest: the common 13 
denominator between the three different theoretical accounts considered in our work was their potential 14 
to predict the presence or absence in of the cost asymmetry in different experimental contexts. As stated 15 
in the introduction, we did not assume internal dominance because evidence in favor of it is lacking in the 16 
extant literature. Although we did not focus on this main effect, which is arguably of a lower theoretical 17 
importance than the robust cost asymmetry found in this study, its actual relationship to internal shielding 18 
remains to be established and explored in future studies. That being said, among the three competing 19 
accounts considered in this study, associative interference appears to provide the best one to account for 20 
the cost asymmetry observed here, which implies an imbalance in shielding between external and internal 21 
attention. 22 
 23 
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This raises the question as to what exactly causes this imbalance in shielding efficiency between 1 
external and internal attention. That is, an important potential implication of our results is that (internal) 2 
attention to memory can be shielded more efficiently than attention to perception. 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
Figure 5. Switch costs for Experiment 1-3. In black: Mean response time and 95% confidence interval 7 
(CI). In white: individual participants’ means. A. Asymmetric switch cost in Experiment 1. B. Asymmetric 8 
in Experiment 2. C. Non-asymmetric cost in Experiment 3. 9 
 10 
 11 
More efficient shielding for internal than external attention? 12 
At face value, this imbalance in shielding implies that internal attention is more readily deployable 13 
- and more easily shielded - than external attention. This conclusion might seem counterintuitive given 14 
the historical bias for using external stimuli in attention research, but it can provide a useful new 15 
perspective on the relationship between external and internal attention. In addition, some indirect evidence 16 
for the idea of internal attention is dominant over external attention is available in the literature. 17 
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First, a large body of neuroimaging data has shown that when participants are unconstrained by an 1 
external task, they reliably revert to a cognitive default mode (“resting-state”), characterized by increased 2 
activity in a network of midline and temporal brain regions (Raichle, 2015, for a review). This network 3 
has been associated with spontaneous, internally directed cognition, for example daydreaming, 4 
autobiographical memory retrieval or mentation about the future. This suggests that internally directed 5 
attention represents the ‘default’ cognitive mode when we are not actively engaged with an external task. 6 
Second, we know from mind-wandering research that, even when performing a task, attention often is 7 
drawn inwardly and ‘mind-wandering’ intrusions occur that disrupt task performance (Seli et al., 2016, 8 
for a review). Finally, research on WM guidance (i.e., internal attention) of external attention reports 9 
strong and automatic internal intrusions in external attention (e.g., Kiyonaga et al., 2012; Olivers et al., 10 
2011). On the other hand, however, it has also been found that external distractors can disrupt internal 11 
maintenance in WM (e.g., Hakim et al., 2019; Whitehead et al., 2019). A direct and systematic comparison 12 
of these effects may prove insightful, but has to our knowledge not been carried out yet. 13 
Alternatively, Tarder-Stoll and colleagues (2019) argue that the imbalance between external and 14 
internal attention is more state-dependent. The argument goes that the balance between external and 15 
internal attention is determined by ‘encoding’ and ‘retrieval’ states (see also Tulving, 2002). In the former 16 
state, attention is primarily externally oriented, whereas it is mostly internally oriented in the latter. Among 17 
other factors, exposure to novel stimuli promotes an (external) ‘encoding’ state by increasing acetylcholine 18 
levels in the hippocampus. Conversely, a familiar context reduces these levels and brings about a retrieval 19 
mode by reducing these levels. In the study presented here and in our previous work (Verschooren et al., 20 
2019), we have re-used the same eight stimuli throughout the task, which may have potentially promoted 21 
a dominant retrieval mode. 22 
Based on the new data presented here, it is not possible to distinguish between a more inherent 23 
versus more state-dependent view, but this issue represents an interesting avenue for further research. 24 
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  1 
Limitations 2 
While we observed strong evidence for the robustness of the asymmetric switch effect between 3 
internal and external attention, and also obtained strong evidence against a priming based explanation for 4 
that effect, it is important to emphasize that we did not find conclusive evidence in favor of associative 5 
interference over memory retrieval mediating that effect in the current series of studies. With this caveat 6 
in mind, it is however important to note that the Bayesian evidence in Experiment 3 goes in the direction 7 
of the absence of an effect, and the external switch cost did increase; two effects which are compatible 8 
solely with the associative interference account. Furthermore, in the literature, there is accumulating 9 
evidence in favor of associative interference and more broadly, memory representations that can modulate 10 
cognitive control (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Braem & Egner, 2018; Egner, 2014; Mayr et al., 2014; Spape 11 
& Hommel, 2008). Hence, it appears important to explore this question further in future studies, preferably 12 
using a variety of experimental procedures. In this context, it would probably be interesting to consider 13 
the possibility of an hybrid model, assuming that associative interference (procedural level) and memory 14 
retrieval (declarative level) might both contribute to the asymmetric switch cost found here. Finally, 15 
another important question raised by this work is whether the increased interference on external trials 16 
originates from the presence of competing external stimuli, from stimulus-location associations activated 17 
in memory, or both. Research on this topic should determine whether differences in shielding efficiency 18 
are general or rather tied to the quality of the distractor. 19 
In addition, it should be noted that in the between-subject design (Experiment 3), we did not find 20 
a general RT difference between the internal and external conditions. In other words, participants are 21 
slower in general when performing an external single-task condition, which is somewhat unexpected. One 22 
potential explanation is that this condition is not very engaging in the absence of the competing internal 23 
task. As argued above, however, this main effect is tangential only, and it does not invalidate our 24 
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interpretation of the asymmetric switch cost in terms of associative interference. At any rate, some caution 1 
is needed  in the interpretation of this effect, and further research is desirable to confirm that it is rooted 2 
in associative interference, as we contend based on these results. 3 
 4 
Conclusions 5 
We report evidence for the notion that associative interference can account for the cost asymmetry 6 
found when switching between (external) perception and (internal) memory. In comparison, priming and 7 
memory retrieval do not provide viable accounts of it. An important new hypothesis derived from this 8 
interpretation is that internal attention may be more easily shielded from external intrusions than the other 9 
way around. We discussed several potential factors creating this imbalance, but additional research is 10 
needed to establish which of them most likely causes it. More broadly, our findings provide further support 11 
for a currently developing framework that places high-level cognitive functions under learning and 12 
memory-driven control (Abrahamse et al., 2016; Braem & Egner, 2018; Egner, 2014; Mayr et al., 2014; 13 
Spape & Hommel, 2008). We advocate that this framework can also be used to explain attention flexibility, 14 
and more specifically the remarkable ability to switch between external and internal attention. 15 
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